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CHASET V. FLEER/SKYBOX INTERNATIONAL, LP:
SWAPPING TRADING CARDS FOR TREBLE DAMAGES-
CAN INDIVIDUALS REALLY SUE TRADING CARD
COMPANIES UNDER THE RICO ACT?
I. TRADING CARDs MAY NOT BE CHILD'S PLAY ANYMORE
Suppose an individual enters an establishment, deposits
money, pulls a lever, and excitedly stares: Flip, flip, flip . .. JACK-
POT! This description may conjure up images of slot machines in a
Las Vegas casino, while it also illustrates what some children do at
their local trading card shops.'
Although companies have manufactured and distributed trad-
ing cards since the nineteenth century, people recently criticized
their marketing practices for inducing gambling. 2 For about a dec-
ade, trading card companies actively have promoted and advertised
the insertion of "chase cards" into trading card packs.-' Because
1. See James Halperin, Kids, Gimmicks, and Coin Collecting, at http://www.
stantonbooks.com/articles/indexl7.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2003) (providing ex-
ample of child's behavior at local trading card store). The author provided a real-
life example:
A friend who operates a coin and trading card shop told me about a
young boy who used a twenty-dollar bill to purchase five packs of pre-
mium trading cards. Instead of leaving the store with his purchase, the
customer deftly tore open the packages and scanned the cards. Finding
nothing of interest, he shrugged as he tossed the lot in a nearby wastebas-
ket! Is there much difference between what this child did and plunking
down chips at a gambling casino?
Id. The term "trading card" as opposed to "baseball card" is used throughout this
Note because the cases and issues discussed involve various sports trading cards
and other non-sports-related cards, like Pokgmon cards. See, e.g., Chaset v. Fleer/
Skybox Int'l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1086 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining difference
between Pokhmon and other types of trading cards).
2. See Chris Stufflestreet, A Somewhat Thorough History of Baseball Cards (1876-
1980), at http://www.geocities.com/chrisstufflestreet/history.html (last visited
Mar. 9, 2003). "The first major, nationally distributed set of cards was issued begin-
ning in 1887 by Goodwin & Co. of New York City." Id.; see also Anthony N. Cabot,
Say It Ain't So, at http://www.lionelsawyer.com/sayj.it.aint.htm (last visited Mar. 9,
2003) (discussing gambling elements evident in trading card industry).
3. See Lawyers Dispute Whether 'Chase' Trading Cards Involve Children in Gambling,
Amount to Racketeering, METROPOLITAN NEwS-ENTERPRISE, Dec. 6, 2001, at 1 (cover-
ing concept and history of "chase cards"), available at http://xvw.metnews.com/
articles/duma120601.htm. The article contends "chase card marketing became
popular about eight years ago" and the rare cards "depict highly popular players or
game pieces and are printed in limited quantities and randomly inserted in sealed
packages.... The odds of obtaining the special cards-or 'insertion rates' as the
industry prefers to call them-are routinely advertised on the packages and in
promotional literature." Id.
(357)
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there is an active secondary market for trading cards, where individ-
uals can sell and trade rare "chase cards," traders create an "artifi-
cially high demand" for the cards. 4 Individuals allege this demand,
the intentional insertion of rare cards in the packages and the ad-
vertisement of the odds of finding such cards, constitutes illegal
gambling. 5 This sudden concern and criticism may have resulted
from the popularity of Pokmon trading cards, which are primarily
marketed to children. 6
Even though adults also trade cards and their activities sustain
the same alleged illegal consequences, anti-trading card activists are
more concerned with the hazards the hobby poses to children.7 If
the illegality of the alleged gambling is not enough, parents and
educators, in an attempt to discourage the hobby, outline its addi-
tional damaging effects.8 Parents fear their children may become
4. See Mike O'Connell, Can Your [sic] Really Sue Pikachu, at http://www.
anotheruniverse.com/tv/Pokemon/Pokemon100899.html (last visited Sep. 15,
2002) (on file with author); see also Steven Kent, Welcome to the Pokemon Casino: Will
the Craze for Collecting Turn Kids into Gamblers?, at http://www.sidewalksunday
school.com/documents/pkemon.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2003) (noting creation
of secondary market). "Those huge payoffs [for trading cards] are a free-market
phenomenon created by collectors independent of the manufacturers. Nintendo
has not offered to buy back [rare] cards for $70, nor does it print a catalog sug-
gesting an amount for how much those cards are worth." Id.
5. See generally Cabot, supra note 2 (insisting insertion of special cards into
random trading card packs constitutes illegal gambling); Consumers Say Pokemon
Cards Constitute Illegal Gambling Enterprise, 11 ANDREWS SPORTS & ENT. REP. 10, 10
(2000) [hereinafter Consumers] ("[P]arents claim ... kids are encouraged to keep
buying [Pokdmon cards] in the hope of acquiring the valuable ones [and] equate
this activity to a lottery .... "). For a discussion of the elements of illegal gambling,
see infra notes 83-108 and accompanying text.
6. See Kent, supra note 4 (" [Pokhmon cards are] the most popular trading cards
on the market today."); see also Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1086 n.1 (discussing plaintiff
who sued Poktmon card manufacturers alleging cards "are used in a card game"
and people buy them "both for the chance to obtain more valuable cards and to
play the game"). For a general discussion of the objectives and rules of the
Pokdmon trading card game, see Basic Rules, at http://www.wizards.com/default.
asp?x=pokemon/rules/welcome (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
7. See Kent, supra note 4 (explaining how children resemble adult gamblers).
"[W]hen the kids buy the cards, they act just like a gambler in a casino-they act
nervously, they perspire, when they open the pack of cards they squeeze them like
a poker player trying to squeeze a flush, and worst of all, they can't stop." Id.; see
also Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1083 (listing most plaintiffs against trading card companies
as "guardian ad litem" for minors); Sheri Wallace, Pokemon: Is It Right for Your Fam-
ily?, at http://www.sheriwallace.com/pokemon.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003)
(noting child psychologist's opinion on effects of card trading). Wallace quotes a
child psychologist: "Although [card trading] seems innocuous, it can lead to some
problems such as long term gambling. I have decided not to allow the cards and
games in my house." Id.
8. See Kyle Parks, Marketing Monster, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 24, 1999, at
1H (mentioning schools where card trading is banned), available at http://www.
sptimes.com/News/102499/Business/Marketingmonster.shtml; see also Hooked on
Vol. 10: p. 357
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addicted to card collecting and trading.9 School officials fear the
Pok~mon phenomenon disrupts educational endeavors.1 0 Some
children even have recognized their own vulnerability to these
dangers.II
Concerned groups and individuals have redirected these fears
and illustrated the dangerous effects of card collecting and trading
in an attempt to vilify the trading card industry.1 2 Other factions
insist proper nurturing can remedy their children's erratic behavior
and suggest parents cannot rightfully blame the trading card indus-
try.1 3 Still, others maintain that the Pok~mon craze is nothing more
than a fad and that parents are partly to blame for its eruption.' 4
Pokemon: Is Pokemon Harmless Entertainment or an Addiction ?, at http://www.pascrell.
com/library/family/1999-12-21_ent-pokemon.shtml (Dec. 21, 1999) [hereinafter
Hooked] (outlining several different concerns over card trading shared by parents
and schools); Kent, supra note 4 (conveying parent's account of children's behav-
ior due to card trading); Wallace, supra note 7 (indicating school official's con-
cerns over card trading).
9. See Hooked, supra note 8 (relaying parents' concern for children's behavior).
"Some [parents] compare their children's behavior to that of an addict, causing
strife between parents and children." Id.; see also Kent, supra note 4 (discussing
father's experience with getting his son to quit trading). After watching his son
collect cards for six or eight months, a father "realized something was wrong, it was
no longer fun. [His son] was anxious, trying to get these cards that evidently are
very rare, very elusive, and they're valuable. And he wasn't getting these cards."
Id. His son tried to quit "but occasionally he [would] buy another pack, hoping
against hope that that [would] be the one that [would] make it all right and cut his
losses." Id.
10. See Parks, supra note 8, at IH (noting children's behavior at schools and
schools' reactions to it). "At most area schools, the cards have been banned be-
cause kids wouldn't stop playing with them in class or fighting over them at recess.
Still, some kids have been surreptitiously making trades in hallways and cafeterias."
Id.; see also Wallace, supra note 7 (highlighting children's card trading habits in
schools). "[T]he trading cards were too disruptive. Students were fighting over
the cards and trying to trade during class .... 'They found it difficult to concen-
trate on schoolwork when they had the cards in their backpacks."' Id.
11. See, e.g., Hooked, supra note 8 (noting thirteen-year-old boy admitted
Pokbnon card collecting is "highly addictive").
12. See Ann Lewinson, Possessed by Pokemon: End-of-the-Millennium Decadence
Rears Its Adorably Monstrous Head, at http://old.valleyadvocate.com/articles/
pokemon.vl.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2003) (commenting on problems with chil-
dren). "It is hardly a stretch to say that today's children are possessed by a demon.
That demon is corporate greed, conspiring to perpetuate itself by turning the
youngest of minds on to the consumerist impulse, indoctrinating them while they
are young, seducing them with cute little monsters." Id.
13. See Pokemania, at http://www.500words.net/pokemania.htm (last visited
Mar. 10, 2003) (criticizing parents for failure to monitor children's habits). React-
ing to stories of children spending "thousands of dollars . . . to complete their
collection" and mothers complaining "the kids came home asking for hundreds of
dollars to purchase single cards," the author suggests old-fashioned parental disci-
pline may be the best remedy. Id.
14. See It's Just Another Fad, at http://www.epinions.com/game-review-51E5-
3275D53-393303DA-prod5 (May 29, 2000) (suggesting parents' overzealous behav-
20031
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Despite some individuals' insistence that "chase card" collecting's
damaging effects could be better alleviated without legal action, sev-
eral parties have attempted to challenge the trading card industry
in the courtroom.15
The case at issue in this Note is Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Interna-
tional, LP.16 This Note begins with the facts surrounding the case. 17
Then, it summarizes the history and purpose of the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 8 Next, this Note
outlines the procedure for successfully filing a civil RICO claim. 19
With that broad outline, this Note then explores the potential
reach of California gambling laws. 20 This Note further examines
treatment of relevant laws with a discussion of how courts in various
jurisdictions have approached RICO claims in the trading card
realm.2' After discussing the relevant laws, this Note observes and
criticizes how the Ninth Circuit approached the issue.22 Finally,
ior heightened expensive holiday-time fads, like Cabbage Patch dolls, Tickle Me Elmo
dolls, Furby dolls, and Beanie Babies, and children learn from their parents that it is
acceptable to pay exorbitant prices for popular toys); see also Our View, DAILY NEWS
LEADER (Staunton, Va.), Dec. 12, 1999, at 4A:
In examining the excesses that have come to be associated with what
should have been innocent children's fads, we can trace the blame di-
rectly back to adults[ ] ... who are sucker enough to allow themselves to
be manipulated, greedy enough to want to cash in on the mania, and
incapable of giving their children direction in their lives as parents.
Id.
15. See, e.g., Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int'l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.
2002) (discussing plaintiffs who sued trading card companies under RICO); Price
v. Pinnacle Brands, Inc., 138 F.3d 602, 604 (5th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Price II]
(involving complaint against card manufacturers); Major League Baseball Props.,
Inc. v. Price, 105 F. Supp. 2d 46, 48 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) [hereinafter MLB Props.]
(exploring trading card purchasers' RICO claim against trading card companies).
For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 24-34, 109-39 and accompanying
text.
16. 300 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2002).
17. For a discussion of the facts surrounding Chaset, see infra notes 24-34 and
accompanying text.
18. For a history of the RICO statutes, see infra notes 35-40 and accompanying
text.
19. For a discussion of the elements necessary to form a civil RICO claim, see
infra notes 41-82 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the California lottery and gambling laws, see infra
notes 90-108 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Price II, 138 F.3d 602, 604-05 (5th Cir. 1998) (describing plain-
tiffs' claim against card manufacturers); MLB Props., 105 F. Supp. 2d 46, 48
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (explaining claim against trading card companies). For case law
regarding RICO claims against trading card manufacturers, see infra notes 109-39
and accompanying text.
22. For an outline and criticism of the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Chaset, see
infra notes 140-78 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 10: p. 357
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this Note hypothesizes the effects the Ninth Circuit's decision may
have on similar RICO claims. 23
II. FACTS OF CHASET V. FLEER/SKYBOX INTERNATIONAL, LP
In Chaset, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of eight sep-
arate but identical claims made by eight similarly situated groups of
plaintiffs.2 4 Each plaintiff group, as purchasers of trading cards, at-
tempted to sue trading card manufacturers under the federal RICO
statute.25 The Ninth Circuit considered whether the plaintiffs had
standing under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) to sue the defendants. 2 6 In the
nearly identical district court cases, the plaintiff trading card pur-
chasers "alleged that the random inclusion of limited edition cards
in packages of otherwise randomly assorted sports and entertain-
ment trading cards constituted unlawful gambling in violation of
RICO."27
The Ninth Circuit noted that limited edition cards "are more
rare than base cards and, thus, they generally are more desirable to
card collectors."28 The court also recognized that on each card
pack or display box, the card manufacturers disclose the odds of
finding a "chase card" in an individual package.29 It further ac-
knowledged the existence of a secondary market created by the
card collectors and traders. -0
23. For propositions of the possible impact of the Ninth Circuit's opinion on
this area of law, see infra notes 179-95 and accompanying text.
24. See Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int'l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 2002)
(affirming district court's dismissals).
25. See id. (describing plaintiffs' claims); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(2000) (outlining basic RICO elements). For a more comprehensive discussion of
the RICO statute sections involved in this case, see infra notes 41-82 and accompa-
nying text.
26. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1085-86 (explaining issue of case); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c) (2000) (noting standing to sue). "Any person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore
in any appropriate United States diltrict court and shall recover threefold the dam-
ages he sustains and the cost of the suit . I..." ld. For a discussion of the elements
of § 1964(c), see infra notes 41-64 and accompanying text. For an outline of the
remaining RICO elements, see infra notes 65-82 and accompanying text.
27. Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1086. For a discussion of what constitutes gambling
under RICO, see infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
28. Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1086. For a broad discussion of the history and mod-
ern popularity of "chase cards," see supra notes 3-15 and accompanying text.
29. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1086 ("Almost every card manufacturer also in-
cludes a disclaimer which states that the advertised odds are an average for the
entire production run and are not guaranteed within an individual pack or box.").
30. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1086 (noting secondary market is "active at trading
card conventions, trading card stores, and on the Internet").
2003]
5
Mudd: Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox International, LP: Swapping Trading Cards
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003
362 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
The plaintiffs argued these three concessions "constituted
gambling, a RICO violation, because the essential elements of gam-
bling-price, chance, and prize-were all present."3l The defend-
ants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim "on the
ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had not suf-
fered an injury cognizable under RICO." 3 2 The district court
granted the motions, dismissed the RICO claims, and filed judg-
ments for the defendants. 33 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, comment-
ing, "[p]urchasers of trading cards do not suffer an injury
cognizable under RICO when they do not receive an insert card."34
III. Rico: FROM CRIME PREVENTION TO Civii. REDEMPTION
A. A Brief History of RICO
In 1970, Congress sought to curb organized crime by enacting
the Federal RICO Act.3- It constructed the statute "to prevent crim-
inal organizations from infiltrating legitimate commercial enter-
prises. '3 6 Congress specifically aimed to regulate the "racketeering
31. Id. ("[T] he purchasers paid at least a portion of the purchase price for the
chance to win an insert card."). For a thorough discussion of the elements of
gambling, see infra notes 83-108 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
history of RICO, see infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
32. Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1086. To have standing under RICO, a plaintiff must
have been "injured in his [or her] business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962 [of U.S.C. chapter 18]." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000). For a compre-
hensive discussion on standing tinder RICO, see infra notes 44-64 and accompany-
ing text. For an outline of all RICO elements, see infra notes 41-82 and
accompanying text.
33. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1086. The district court declared that the plaintiffs
lacked standing tinder 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) because they "struck a bargain with
Defendants and received the benefit of their bargain." Id. (quoting Dumas v. Ma-
jor League Baseball Props., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1223 (S.D. Cal. 2000)
'[hereinafter Dumas II]). The Ninth Circuit did not consider the validity or possi-
bility of the plaintiffs' state law claims. See id. at 1083-88 (neglecting state law
claims). For the district court's discussion of these state law claims, see infra notes
128-32 and accompanying text.
34. Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1087 ("[D]isappointment upon not finding an insert
card in the package is not an injury to property.").
35. See Donald W. Cassidy, Comment, Turning RICO on Its Head: Schiffels v.
Kemper Financial Services, Inc. and the Need to Limit Standing Under 1962(d) to Plain-
tiffs Who Allege Injuries from Racketeering Acts, 78 MINN. L. REv. 467, 470-89 (1993)
(providing brief history of RICO).
36. Dana P. Babb, Recent Development: Asked but Not Answered-Accrual of Private
Civil RICO Claims Following Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1149, 1150
(1998). The author further noted:
RICO criminalizes three distinct activities. First, ... using or investing
income derived "from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collec-
tion of an unlawful debt" to acquire an interest in or establish or operate
any enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate commerce. Second ...
acquiring or maintaining any interest or control of any enterprise en-
[Vol. 10: p. 357
6
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol10/iss2/5
POK1 MON GAMBLING AND RICO
activity" it named in the statute.37 Notwithstanding this objective,
"RICO also has broad application beyond the organized crime con-
text, since Congress has mandated that RICO 'be liberally con-
strued to effectuate its remedial purposes.' "38
This liberal construction has given individuals an attempt to
curtail certain business operations. 39 Imagine a child in a local
trading card shop: So long as his or her parents can meet the nec-
essary requirements, they can file a RICO suit against trading card
companies to allege an illegal gambling scheme. 40
B. The Basics of Civil RICO Claims
Despite the primary intent of RICO to deter and regulate crim-
inal behavior, individuals may also use the statute for civil relief.41
A RICO violation "requires (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3)
through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity," in addition to prov-
ing standing.42 A plaintiff has standing if the proscribed conduct
"injure [s] [him or her] in his [or her] business or property. '43
gaged in or affecting interstate commerce, or conducting or participating
in such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering or collection of un-
lawful debt. Finally, RICO makes a conspiracy to engage in any such con-
duct illegal.
Id. at 1150-51 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1998)). For a complete description
of the behavior prohibited by RICO, see 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000).
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2000). The non-exhaustive list of racketeering
activities includes "any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, ar-
son, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a con-
trolled substance or listed chemical . . . which is chargeable under State law and
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year[,]" as well as any various
other acts "indictable under ... provisions of Title 18, United States Code." Id.
38. Daniel Luccaro et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 1211, 1212-13 (2001) (quoting Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat.
942 (1970)).
39. See, e.g., Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1086 (exemplifying parents' challenges against
alleged fraudulent activity of trading card companies); Price II, 138 F.3d 602, 604(5th Cir. 1998) (outlining civil RICO challenge against trading card company);
MLB Props., 105 F. Supp. 2d 46, 48 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (illustrating civil RICO suit
against trading card company).
40. See Halperin, supra note 1 (identifying children's abnormal behavior).
For a discussion of the requirements for a civil RICO claim, see infra notes 41-82
and accompanying text.
41. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000) ("Any person injured in his business or
property... may sue.., in any United States district court ...."); see also Cassidy,
supra note 35, at 470 ("In the last decade ... RICO has become an increasingly
popular ... tool in general civil litigation . . ").
42. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985) [hereinafter
Sedima II]. The Court adapted this list of requirements from 18 U.S.C. § 1962. See
id. at 482-83.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000); see also Luccaro et al., supra note 38, at 1262-
68 (providing general description of civil RICO requirements). For a detailed
analysis of each civil RICO element, see infra notes 44-82 and accompanying text.
2003]
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1. Standing
Before a court considers the four primary elements required
for a RICO claim, it first must determine whether the plaintiff has
standing to sue. 44 The standing requirement ensures that "the lib-
eral construction clause [does not amount to] an invitation to apply
RICO to new purposes that Congress never intended."4 5
The Supreme Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 46 while dis-
pelling prior courts' concerns that civil RICO relief exceeded its
intended limits, insisted the statutory language unambiguously re-
layed Congress's broad intent.47 The main issue in that case was
whether the civil RICO plaintiff's injury "must be somehow differ-
ent in kind from the direct injury resulting from the predicate acts
of racketeering activity."'4  The district court found a civil RICO
plaintiff must allege some "RICO-type injury" or "racketeering in-
jury" distinct from that resulting from the "predicate act."49
The Second Circuit emphasized the necessity for a "racketeer-
ing injury" because to require less would overextend congressional
intent.51 The Supreme Court refused to adhere to the Second Cir-
cuit's notion of a "racketeering injury" and noted, "[a] reading of
the statute belies any such requirement."' l The Court ultimately
44. See GREGORY P. JOSEPH, CIVIL RICO: A DEFINITIVE GUIDE 30 (ABA Publ'g
2d ed. 2000) ("Unless the plaintiff can demonstrate actual harm, [he or she] may
not maintain an action.").
45. Cassidy, supra note 35, at 479 (citing Reves v. Ernst & Young, 570 U.S. 170
(1993)); see aLvo Steele v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 36 F.3d 69, 70 (9th Cir. 1994) (quiot-
ing Oscar v. Univ. Students Co-Op Ass'n, 956 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 1992)) (not-
ing courts want to ensure "RICO is not expanded to provide a 'federal cause of
action and treble damages to every tort plaintiff"). For a brief mention of the
liberal construction clause, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
46. Sedima II, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
47. See id. at 497 ("RICO is to be read broadly[.]").
48. Id. at 484. The plaintiff alleged that the illicit mail and wire fraud activi-
ties, which qualified the defendant for RICO under 18 U.S.C. § 1962, also caused
the injury to its business, which satisfied the 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) requirement. See
id. (explaining plaintiffs' allegations). For a discussion of what constitutes "predi-
cate acts," see infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
49. See Sedima 11, 473 U.S. at 484. (discussing type of injury required). If an
individual illegally gambled causing injury to another, the predicate act would be
the gambling. See id. The district court required an injury separate from that result-
ing from the predicate act. See id.
50. See id. at 495 (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 492 (2d
Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Sedima I]). The Second Circuit labeled the "racketeering
injury" requirement an "obligation that the plaintiff show injury different in kind
from that occurring as a result of the predicate acts themselves, or not simply
caused by the predicate acts, but also caused by an activity which RICO was de-
signed to deter." Sedima 1, 741 F.2d at 496.
51. Sedima I, 473 U.S. at 495. The Court continued:
[Vol. 10: p. 357
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held that "the compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused by
predicate acts."52
Seven years later, in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,53
the Supreme Court further qualified standing under RICO by re-
quiring proximate cause between the illicit activity and the injury. 54
In that case, the plaintiff corporation sued Holmes under RICO,
among other claims, for "conspir[ing] in a stock-manipulation
scheme" that forced the corporation to reimburse customers. 55
The district court found for Holmes on the RICO claim because the
plaintiff "had [not] satisfied the 'proximate cause requirement
under RICO."' 56 The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding error in the
district court's reasoning that Holmes's individual predicate acts ac-
tually must have injured the plaintiff.5 7
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's findings "be-
cause the alleged conspiracy to manipulate did not proximately
cause the injury claimed," and the plaintiff's claim did not "make
out a right to sue petitioner under [18 U.S.C.] § 1964(c)."58 The
Court looked to statutes upon which Congress modeled RICO to
determine that the "by reason of' language in 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
required a showing of proximate cause between the predicate act
If the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner
forbidden by these provisions, and the racketeering activities injure the
plaintiff in his business or property, the plaintiff has a claim under [18
U.S.C.] § 1964(c). There is no room in the statutory language for an
additional, amorphous "racketeering injury" requirement.
Id.
52. Id. at 497; see also Luccaro et al., supra note 38, at 1266 (discussing merits
of standing).
53. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
54. See Luccaro et al., supra note 38, at 1267 (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268).
55. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 261. The plaintiff specifically alleged Holmes
"made false statements about the prospects of one of the six companies . . .of
which he was an officer, director, and major shareholder; and that over an ex-
tended period he sold small amounts of stock in one of the other six companies
... to simulate a liquid market." Id. at 263. The plaintiff attempted to subrogate
the claims of individual "nonpurchasing customers" who were remote from the
injury caused to the brokers. See id. at 270-74. The brokers went bankrupt due to
the defendant's conspiracy, and the "nonpurchasing customers" were customers of
the brokers who had no financial ties to the tainted stock. See id. at 272. Neverthe-
less, they could not recover from the bankrupt brokers. See id. Because the plain-
tiff had to reimburse the "nonpurchasing customers" for their losses, the plaintiff
attempted to subrogate to their non-existing claim. See id. at 270-74.
56. Id. at 264.
57. See id. ("[T] he appeals court held the finding of no proximate cause to be
error, the result of a mistaken focus on the causal relation between [the plaintiff's]
injury and the acts of Holmes alone.").
58. Id. at 275. The Court admitted it generally "use[d] 'proximate cause' to
label generically the judicial tools used to limit a person's responsibility for the
consequences of that person's own acts." Id. at 268.
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and the resulting injury.59 Despite the plaintiffs assertions, the
Court denied it was acting "illiberal in [its] construction" of the
statutes, and held that only the proper, proximately situated plain-
tiff could utilize RICO in a civil context.60
No court has construed plainly the meaning of "business oi"
property," but the Second Circuit noted, "[t]he requirement that
the injury be to the plaintiff's business or property means that the
plaintiff must show a proprietary type of damage."'61 Instead of pro-
viding a concrete rule or test, many courts have defined effectively
"business or property" by limiting its application. 62 Essentially,
59. See id. at 267-68. The Court compared RICO to section 4 of the Clayton
Act, which contained similar language. See id. at 267-68; see also Clayton Act § 4, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (2000) (original version at ch. 323, § 4, 38 Star. 730, 731-32 (1914)).
The Court further noted that in Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519 (1983), it had "held that a plaintiffs right to sue tinder § 4 [of the Clay-
ton Act] required a showing that the defendant's violation not only was a 'but for'
cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well." Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268.
In turn, the Court:
[C]redit[ed] the 91st Congress, which enacted RICO, with knowing the
interpretation federal courts had given the words earlier Congresses had
used ... in the Clayton Act's § 4.... It used the same words, and we can
only assume it intended them to have the same meaning that courts had
already given them.
Id.
60. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 274. The Court rationalized:
[W]e fear that RICO's remedial purposes would more probably be hob-
bled than helped by [the plaintiff's] version of liberal construction: Al-
lowing suits by those injured only indirectly would open the door to
"massive and complex damages litigation [that would] not only burden
the courts, but [would] also undermine the effectiveness of treble-dam-
ages suits."
Id. (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 545) (emphasis added).
61. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 515 (2d Cir. 1984); see also
Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d
801, 821 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (noting proprietary nature of "business or property").
62. See Oscar v. Univ. Students Co-Op. Ass'n, 965 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding nuisance to property insufficient for RICO standing); Taffet v. S.
Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1488 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating fraudulent rate increases by
utility companies provided no cognizable RICO damage to utility customers); Berg
v. First State Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[P]ersonal injury, includ-
ing emotional distress, is not compensable under [18 U.S.C.] § 1964(c) of
RICO."); Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889, 892 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding shareholders
unable to bring RICO claim for diminution in stock values caused by injuries to
corporation); Bass v. Campagnone, 838 F.2d 10, 11-12 (Ist Cir. 1988) (determin-
ing financial damage to local union by officer's RICO violation did not give indi-
vidual union members standing to sue); Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 847 (11th
Cir. 1988) ("[Plecuniary losses are so fundamentally a part of personal injuries
that they should be considered something other than injury to 'business or prop-
erty.'"); Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d 1173, 1174 (7th Cir. 1985) (deciding taxpayers
could not seek RICO action for tax increases due to illegal bribery); see alsoJoSEP-H,
supra note 44, at 33 ("Creditors, including guarantors, are generally held to have
no more standing to sue than shareholders for RICO violations perpetrated on a
debtor corporation.").
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plaintiffs have standing if they can show they "[have] suffered a
concrete financial loss . ..proximately caused by the fraudulent
conduct."63 If illegal gambling were the illicit activity for which one
sued, he or she must prove a proprietary injury that extends beyond
mere loss of money or loss of chance. 64
2. Conduct
Once a plaintiff attains standing, he or she must then satisfy
the four customary RICO requirements. 65 The "conduct" element
simply requires the defendant to "[conduct] or [participate] in the
conduct or the affairs of [an] enterprise," but not without some
intricacies. 66 The Supreme Court requires the "defendant's predi-
cate acts [to] 'rise to the level' of participation in the management
or operation of the enterprise. '67 The Court further extends this
description to the enterprise's professional advisors, such as attor-
neys and accountants. 68 Still, no matter how broadly courts expand
the scope, "the [individual's] involvement must rise to the level of
decision-making."69
3. Enterprise
The RICO statute clearly defines an "enterprise" as "any indi-
vidual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity,
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
63. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Stites, 258 F.3d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001)
(citing Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1481 (9th Cir. 1994)).
64. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000). For an in-depth discussion of courts' sug-
gestions as to satisfying the injury requirement for a RICO claim in the gambling
context, see infra notes 131-32, 138-39 and accompanying text.
65. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964(c) (2000). For a list of the standard RICO
requirements, see supra notes 4243 and accompanying text.
66. Luccaro et al., supra note 38, at 1236 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)).
67. Id. (citing Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177-95 (1993)). The
authors noted: "Actions involving a low degree of decision-making may not consti-
tute participation in the affairs of the enterprise. One must play some role in
directing the affairs of the enterprise to 'conduct or participate' in the affairs of
the enterprise." Id.
68. See id. at 1236-37. The authors added that the enterprise may be "'oper-
ated'" or 'managed' by others 'associated with' the enterprise who exert control
over it as, for example, by bribery." Id. (quoting Reves, 507 U.S. at 184). The lower
courts even have "extended RICO liability to employees who carry out instruc-
tions." Id. (citing United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1999); United
States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1543 (8th Cir. 1995); MCM Partners, Inc. v. An-
drews-Bartlett & Assocs., 62 F.3d 967, 974 (7th Cir. 1995)).
69. Id. (citing United States v. Swan, 224 F.3d 632, 635 (7th Cir. 2000);
Bancoklahoma Mortgage Corp. v. Capital Title Co., 194 F.3d 1089, 1101 (10th Cir.
1999); Bachman v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 178 F.3d 930, 932-33 (7th Cir. 1999)).
2003]
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not a legal entity.'' 7° The Supreme Court has determined that en-
terprises need not have an economic motive to satisfy the require-
ment.7 1 The Court also has approved of both legitimate and
illegitimate enterprises, even though the statute does not encom-
pass both explicitly. 72 Lower courts have expanded the Court's lib-
eral construction even further.73  This breadth ensures that
"[w]hen a 'legal' entity is the enterprise under consideration,
'there [will be] little difficulty in proving the existence of the enter-
prise [because] proof that the entity in question has a legal exis-
tence satisfies the enterprise element.' ,74
4. Pattern
The RICO "pattern" constraint "requires at least two acts of
racketeering activity ... the last of which occurred within ten years
(excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a
prior act of racketeering activity."' 75 The Supreme Court has inter-
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2000). Nevertheless:
To violate RICO, a person must either, directly or indirectly, acquire in-
terests in or administer an "enterprise." ... It is immaterial whether the
defendant has a stake in the .. .enterprise .... [I]n an action under [18
U.S.C.] § 1962(c) all circuits now require that the "person" be separate
from the "enterprise" which conducts its affairs through a pattern of
racketeering.
Luccaro et al., supra note 38, at 1223, 1231.
71. See Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 249 (1994)
(showing no need for enterprise to have economic motive).
72. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-87 (1981) (holding drug
trafficking organization to be RICO enterprise). "Because the Court could not
find any indication in the legislative history that such illegitimate associations were
not to be considered 'enterprises,' it opted instead for the broader definition
which expanded the range of activities that RICO covered." David Kurzweil, Crimi-
nal and Civil RICO: Traditional Canons of Statutory Interpretation and the Liberal Con-
struction Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 41, 79 (1996).
73. See United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1337 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding
criminal gang constitutes enterprise); United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1525
(11 th Cir. 1996) (holding religious cult to be enterprise); United States v. London,
66 F.3d 1227, 1243 (Ist Cir. 1995) (determining sole proprietorship employing at
least one other person could be RICO enterprise); Magnalock Corp. v. Schnabolk,
65 F.3d 256, 263 (2d Cir. 1995) (treating two corporations owned by same individ-
ual as enterprise); United States v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586, 597 (9th Cir. 1993) (in-
cluding governmental entities as enterprises); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Townson,
912 F. Supp. 291, 295 (E.D. Tenn. 1995) (finding marriage suitable as enterprise).
But see Elliott v. Foufas, 867 F.2d 877, 881 (5th Cir. 1989) ("An inanimate object
such as an apartment cannot constitute a RICO enterprise.").
74. Luccaro et al., supra note 38, at 1227. "A restrictive definition of enter-
prise excluding legal entities from its scope would[ ] lead to the bizarre result that
only criminals who failed to form corporate shells to aid their illicit schemes could
be reached by RICO." Id. at 1224.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2000). "Where a single action violates more than
one of the [racketeering activities] recited in [18 U.S.C.] section 1961(1), it consti-
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preted this simple statutory language to require "continuous and
interrelated" activity.7 6 RICO claims should be dismissed "at the
earliest possible stage of the litigation, unless the plaintiff specifi-
cally alleges that the RICO acts occurred over an extended period
of time (at least one year)."77 Courts essentially agree that "legisla-
tive history indicate [s] that a 'pattern of racketeering activity' [is] to
be flexible and based on 'a commonsense, everyday understanding
of RICO's language and Congress' gloss on it.'"T7
5. Racketeering Activity
The "racketeering activity" requirement encompasses "nine
classes of state criminal felony laws, any act 'indictable' under fifty-
four specific federal criminal provisions, any federal 'offense' in-
volving bankruptcy or securities fraud, and any narcotics-related ac-
tutes only a single predicate act for RICO purposes, not multiple predicate acts." Jo-
SEPH, supra note 44, at 80-81 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Walgren,
885 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1989)).
76. See Luccaro et al., supra note 38, at 1218 ("RICO does not target sporadic
activity."). "Based on legislative history, the Supreme Court [in H.J. Inc. v. North-
western Bell Telephone Co.] determined that 'to prove a pattern of racketeering
activity a plaintiff or prosecutor must show that the racketeering predicates are
related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity."'
William E. Marple, "Pattern" Requirement Renders RICO Inapplicable to Ordinary Busi-
ness Disputes, 14 Rrv. LITIG. 343, 349 (1995) (quoting HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989)). "The 'continuity' component is met by either
closed-ended continuity, defined as 'a series of related predicates extending over a
substantial period of time,' or open-ended continuity, defined as conduct that
poses a threat of extending into the future." Luccaro et al., supra note 38, at 1219
(quoting H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242). "The Court recognized that its definition of
'pattern of racketeering activity' would apply in criminal as well as civil actions."
Kurzweil, supra note 72, at 85 (citing H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 255 (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
77. Marple, supra note 76, at 364. Limiting the scope in this way:
[M]inimizes the time, effort, and money that defendants must expend to
obtain dismissal of baseless RICO allegations .... [I]t prevents the unwar-
ranted besmirching of the reputations of respectable businesses and their
employees that inevitably results from explicit or implicit allegations of
racketeering .... [And] it prevents the needless clogging of the federal
civil docket with RICO cases, many of which lack any basis for federal
jurisdiction.
Id. at 364-65.
78. Kurzweil, supra note 72, at 85 (quoting H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 241). This
common-sense approach helps courts to determine:
[A] rchetypical mobster activity, such as a hoodlum selling "insurance" to
a neighborhood's storekeepers with a warning that he will reappear each
month to collect the "premium," supplies the requisite threat of con-
tinuity. In the case of an otherwise legitimate business, the continuity
prong of the pattern requirement could be demonstrated by showing that
the predicate acts are a "regular way of conducting [the] ongoing legiti-
mate business."
Marple, supra note 76, at 349 (quoting H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242-43).
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tivities 'punishable' under federal law." 79 Congress targeted these
activities because they are the types habitually performed by the
criminal organizations that it sought to eradicate.80 Although
"racketeering activity" generally is treated as a separate element,
some courts and scholars link it with the "pattern" component, and
consider the combination to be the essential RICO requirement.81
The statute would serve no realistic purpose if not for this
requirement.8 2
C. Gambling as a Racketeering Activity
Illegal gambling is one of the many racketeering activities
against which RICO protects. 83 While the RICO statute specifically
mentions three federal laws prohibiting certain gambling activities,
it also allows individual state laws to dictate what constitutes illegal
gambling.84 Therefore, if individuals habitually breach either the
specified federal gambling laws or an individual state gambling reg-
ulation, they fulfill the "pattern" and "racketeering activity" RICO
requirements.8 5
The three gambling-related federal statutes that can trigger a
RICO action cover a wide variety of gambling activities.8 6 Two of
them involve the transmission and transportation of wagering infor-
mation and paraphernalia.8 7 The third is broader, defining illegal
79. Cassidy, supra note 35, at 472-73 ("These crimes are termed 'predicate
acts' for the act of racketeering."); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2000). For a list of
the nine classes, see supra note 37.
80. See Babb, supra note 36, at 1150-51 n.14 (discussing congressional intent).
For more discussion on the history and intent of RICO, see supra notes 35-38 and
accompanying text.
81. See Babb, supra note 36, at 1152 ("The focal point of RICO is the pattern
of racketeering activity requirement.").
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000). For a discussion of the purpose of the RICO
statute, see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
83. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2000) (listing gambling as racketeering activity).
84. See id. (determining what constitutes gambling activity). This section spe-
cifically lists 18 U.S.C. §§ 1084, 1953, and 1955 as federal statutes dealing with
illegal gambling activities. See id. For a thorough discussion of these three statutes,
see infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
85. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (identifying requirements for filing of RICO action).
For a discussion of the pattern and racketeering activity RICO requirements, see
supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
86. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1084, 1953, 1955 (2000). For an in-depth treatment of
these statutes, see infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
87. See 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (prohibiting gambling using wire communica-
tions); 18 U.S.C. § 1953 (targeting transportation of gambling devices). Section
1084(a) specifically states:
Whoever ... uses a wire communication facility for the transmission ...
of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wa-
gers[] ... or for the transmission of a wire communication which entitles
14
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gambling businesses and outlining the penalties for the prohibited
activities in which they participate.8 8 Despite the latter statute's fed-
eral codification, it expressly relies upon states' gambling
regulations.89
California prohibits various gambling activities.90 Although
the state constitution permits the state-run operation of the Califor-
nia State Lottery, it prohibits other types of lotteries. 9' The Califor-
nia Legislature broadly defined the term lottery, but its extensions
are indefinite. 92 In California, a lottery exists when a scheme or
the recipient to receive money or credit [from] bets or wagers, or for
information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be
[punished].
18 U.S.C. § 1084(a). Section 1953 specifies, "[w]hoever... knowingly carries or
sends . . . any record, paraphernalia, ticket, certificate, bills, slip, token, paper,
writing, or other device used [for] ... (a) bookmaking; or (b) wagering pools with
respect to a sporting event; or (c) in a numbers, policy, bolita, or similar game
shall be [punished]." Id. § 1953(a).
88. See 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) ("Whoever conducts, finances, manages, super-
vises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business shall be [pun-
ished]."). Section 1955(b) defines gambling business as illegal when it: "(i)
[violates] the law of a State or political subdivision in which it [conducts its busi-
ness]; (ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise,
direct, or own all or part of such business; and (iii) has been or remains in substan-
tially continuous operation." Id. § 1955(b) (1). The statute also defines gambling
as "includ[ing] but ... not limited to pool-selling, bookmaking, maintaining slot
machines, roulette wheels or dice tables, and conducting lotteries, policy, bolita or
numbers games, or selling chances therein." Id. § 1955(b) (2) (emphasis added).
89. See id. § 1955(b)(1)(i) (defining illegal gambling business as "violation of
the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted").
90. SeeCAL. CONST. art. IV, § 19(a), (e) (discussing California's prohibition of
casinos and lotteries other than California State Lottery). But see CAL. CONST. art.
IV, § 19(b), (d), (f), (g) (allowing regulation of horse races, authorization of
bingo games, and negotiation with Native Americans and nonprofit organizations
desiring to conduct illegal gambling activities).
91. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 19(d) (permitting "establishment of a California
State Lottery"). Section 19(a) denies the state legislature power to authorize lot-
teries and prohibit the sale of lottery tickets within the state. See id. § 19(a).
92. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 319 (West 2002). The code defines lottery as
follows:
A lottery is any scheme for the disposal or distribution of property by
chance, among persons who have paid or promised to pay any valuable
consideration for the chance of obtaining such property or a portion of
it, or for any share or any interest in such property, upon any agreement,
understanding, or expectation that it is to be distributed or disposed of
by lot or chance, whether called a lottery, raffle, or gift-enterprise, or by
whatever name the same may be known.
Id.; see also RUFUs KING, GAMBLING & ORGANIZED CRIME 51-52 (1969). "The lottery
category [of gambling] is perhaps the oldest in gambling, and also the broadest in
scope. . . . Each of [the elements of lotteries] has given rise to argument and
confusion, and all have been extensively litigated in U.S. courts." Id. at 52.
2003]
15
Mudd: Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox International, LP: Swapping Trading Cards
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003
372 Vn1J1r'JOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL,
operation incorporates the elements of consideration, chance, and
prize.9 3
The consideration element "is the fee (in the form of money
or anything else of value) that a participant pays the operator for
entrance. '94 Courts should determine this element from the posi-
tion of the plaintiff rather than the defendant. 95 The plaintiffs' po-
sition in relation to certain schemes can determine the satisfaction
of the consideration requirement.9"
The chance element requires "winning and losing [to] depend
on luck and fortune rather than, or at least more than, judgment
and skill."'97 All parties to the activity must understand and agree to
this dependence. 98 While a participant's skill or lack thereof may
93. See People v. Cardas, 28 P.2d 99, 100 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1933)
("An analysis of [CAL. PENAL CODE § 319] and an examination of the authorities
construing it and other similar statutory provisions disclose that there are three
elements necessary to constitute a lottery."); People v. Hecht, 3 P.2d 399, 401 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1931) ("In order to decide whether the scheme adopted in
this case was a lottery, it must be determined whether the [three listed] elements
are present.").
94. Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union v. Davis, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d
56, 62 (1999) (citing Cal. Gas Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Corp., 330 P.2d 778
(Cal. 1958)). Consideration has been defined more simply as including "one who
has hazarded something of value upon the chance" of receiving a prize. Hecht, 3
P.2d at 401.
95. See Cardas, 28 P.2d at 100 ("The question of consideration is not to be
determined from the standpoint of the defendant, but from that of the holders of
prize tickets.").
96. See, e.g., Cal. Gas Retailers, 330 P.2d at 785 (finding absence of considera-
tion where chances to receive free gasoline were given away to both paying custom-
ers and non-paying public); Cardas, 28 P.2d at 100-01 (finding no consideration
where lottery ticket holders indiscriminately received their prize chances from the-
atre company that required no further purchase of admission ticket or any other
product). The Cardas court noted two instances similar to its case where courts
tended to find lotteries:
In one group it will be found that the prize tickets were only firnished to
customers-those who purchased something. The payment made by the
customer was for both the article purchased and the prize ticket-part of
the consideration was for the ticket .... In the other group, it will be
found that, while the distribution of prize tickets purported to be both to
noncustomers as well as to customers, in fact the distribution to the for-
mer class was negligible.
Id. at 101 (citing State v. Powell, 212 N.W. 169 (Minn. 1927); Featherstone v. In-
dep. Serv. Station Ass'n, 10 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1928); Matta v. Katsoulas, 212 N.W.
261 (Wis. 1927)).
97. Davis, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 62 (citing Finster v. Keller, 96 Cal. Rptr. 241
(Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Hecht, 3 P.2d at 399).
98. See Finster, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 245-46 ("There must be an understanding,
agreement or expectation the distribution will be determined by chance."). To
uphold the element, the chance of receiving the prize must be "independent of
the will of the manager of the game, according to a scheme held out to the public,
whether he who paid the money should have the prize or nothing." Id. at 246 n.3
(quoting Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 15 N.E. 491, 494 (Mass. 1888)).
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affect the outcome, courts look more to the character of the activity
to determine whether it is one of chance or skill. 99 The courts
make this determination by deciding which element more greatly
influences the activity. 10 0
The prize element "encompasses property that the operator of-
fers to distribute to one or more winning participants and not to
keep for himself."10 1 The prize may be something separate from
the consideration paid for the activity-e.g., a vacation or car-or it
may derive from the accumulation of consideration-e.g., a money
raffle.' 0 2 Either way, the participant must know the prize's identity
before commencing the activity. 1° -' This fixture preserves the char-
acter of the lottery and distinguishes it from a "banking game,"
where the prize value may vary and the activity's operator may keep
it, if uncollected.10 4 The nature of a lottery ensures that some par-
ticipant will win the designated prize. 10 5
Another California statute, which can relate to gambling activ-
ity and may affect a RICO action, is the California Business and
Professions Code.' 0 6 The act specifically seeks to prohibit "any un-
99. See id. at 246 ("It is the character of the game rather than a particular
player's skill or lack of it that determines whether the game is one of chance or
skill.").
100. See id. (declaring test to be whether chance or skill is "the dominating
factor in determining the result of the game"). Finster involved an elaborate bet-
ting scheme at a horse track where experienced and inexperienced bettors placed
wagers. See id. at 241. Even though the experienced bettors, because of their skill,
may have had a better chance than those without experience, the court still deter-
mined, "if skill and judgment be assumed upon the part of all the players, the
known results in many instances [still] show a large element of chance." Id. at 244-
46.
101. Davis, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 62 (citing W. Telecon, Inc. v. Cal. State Lottery,
917 P.2d 651, 655-57 (Cal. 1996)).
102. See id. ("The property offered may exist apart from the fees the partici-
pants pay the operator or it may arise from the fees themselves.").
103. See id. ("The prize or prizes, however, must be 'either fixed in advance'
of the play or 'determined by the total amount' of fees paid.").
104. See W. Telecon, 917 P.2d at 655-58. A lottery operator has "no interest in
the outcome" because the disposition of the prize does not "[depend] upon
which, or how many, of the lottery entrants might win it." Id. at 657. By contrast, a
banking game operator does have an interest "because the amount of money the
operator will have to pay out depends upon whether each of the individual bets is
won or lost." Id.
105. See id. at 655 ("A lottery must involve distribution of one or more
prizes.").
106. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, 17202, 17203, 17206 (West 1997)
(outlining method for bringing action for unfair competition); see also Dumas v.
Major League Baseball Props., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1172 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
[hereinafter Dumas I] (introducing plaintiff's use of statute to bring state claim
adjacent to RICO claim); Schwartz v. Upper Deck Co., 967 F. Supp. 405, 406 (S.D.
Cal. 1997) [hereinafter Schwartz II] (considering plaintiffs' use of statute to bring
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lawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, de-
ceptive, untrue or misleading advertising."' 0 7 While this facilitates
a California state claim, the principles upon which it is based also
could help to support elements of an alternative RICO claim. 10 8
D. Trading Cards for Complaints
The type of irregular behavior that trading cards have caused
in children-like that highlighted at the beginning of this Note-
have caused great fear and subsequent response among parents. 0 9
Within the last decade, individuals throughout the country have at-
tempted to bring claims against trading card manufacturers for
state gambling law violations and subsequent RICO violations." 0
The claims in each jurisdiction have been similar-that by ran-
domly inserting valuable "chase cards" into trading card packages,
card manufacturers create illegal lotteries, punishable under state
alternative state claim). For more treatment of Dumas I and Schwartz II, see infra
notes 135, 159-60, 171-72 and accompanying text.
107. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997). Section 17202 states:
"[S]pecific or preventive relief may be granted to enforce a penalty, forfeiture, or
penal law in a case of unfair competition." Id. § 17202. Section 17203 authorizes
courts to enjoin and "make such orders or judgments ... as may be necessary to
prevent the use or employment by any person of any practice which constitutes
unfair competition." Id. § 17203. Section 17206 lists the various remedies availa-
ble to civil plaintiffs. See id. § 17206.
108. See, e.g., Dumas II, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1223 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (discuss-
ing plaintiffs' failure to achieve proper RICO standing by asserting injury from
"fraudulent or dishonest conduct"). "There is no allegation that Defendants have
engaged in any sort of fraudulent or dishonest conduct such as misrepresenting to
purchasers the odds of winning a chase card." Id. For a more in-depth discussion
of Dumas II, see infra notes 133-39 and accompanying text. For an outline of the
elements of a RICO action, see supra notes 41-82 and accompanying text.
109. See Kent, supra note 4. For a discussion of children's erratic behavior, see
supra notes 1, 7-15 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int'l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.
2002) (consolidating numerous district court cases within Ninth Circuit, where in-
dividual trading card purchasers and traders sought relief from trading card com-
panies under RICO); Price II, 138 F.3d 602, 604 (5th Cir. 1998) (hearing appeal of
class-action suit brought by certain individuals asserting right to damages under
RICO for alleged gambling violations by trading card manufacturer); MLB Props.,
105 F. Supp. 2d 46, 48 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (hearing action for declaratory judgment
by trading card manufacturers and licensors against individual card purchasers
and traders seeking to sue for RICO violation). For a thorough treatment of these
cases, see infra notes 117-50 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the ele-
ments of a RICO action, see supra notes 41-82 and accompanying text. For an
assessment of what constitutes gambling, see supra notes 83-105 and accompanying
text.
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gambling laws and the RICO Act. 11 The courts have been reluc-
tant to validate these arguments."12
While the litigation is a modern trend, the sentiments of the
litigants are not new, nor are they exclusive to the Pok~mon realm. 31 3
Most people probably remember Beanie Babies and Pogs, but they
probably remember them solely as a trend, and forget the uproar
they caused during their peaks in popularity. 114 As the fads have
evolved from marbles to Pogs to Beanie Babies to Pok~mon, the compe-
tition among children fostered by each activity has mirrored its
predecessors, but the responses by adults have changed greatly. 115
While winning an opponent's marbles on a playground used to be
allowed, doing so with Pogs was not, and now attempting to trade
Pokfmon cards in any fashion has spawned numerous lawsuits. 116
The first such case was Price v. Pinnacle Brands, Inc.117 The
plaintiffs filed a class action suit and "contend[ed] that the [defen-
dant trading card manufacturer was] engaged in an enterprise of
illegal gambling which caused them harm; namely, that [the defen-
dant was] engaged in a gambling conspiracy with [professional
sports leagues, players' associations,] and other sports entities." 8
111. See, e.g., Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1086 ("The plaintiffs asserted that the market-
ing and distribution of trading cards constituted gambling, a RICO violation, be-
cause the essential elements of gambling... were all present."). For a discussion
of the elements of a RICO suit, see supra notes 41-82 and accompanying text. For
an analysis of California gambling laws and their required elements, see supra
notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Price II, 138 F.3d at 605, 608 (affirming district court's holding
that plaintiff had not established proper standing to maintain successful RICO ac-
tion). For more on Price II, see infra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
113. See High-Stakes Pogging: Is It Too Intense for Sensitive Children to Endure?, 9
CAN. Bus. & CURRENT AFF. 29, 29 (1995) (noting public belief that Pogs en-
couraged gambling among children).
114. See id. ("[Miany school administrators ... banned pogging, claiming that
it [was] a form of gambling that leads to fist fights and delinquency from stud-
ies."); see also Mike Burns, Marbles, Pogs and Other Life Lessons, BALT. SUN, Feb. 5,
1995, at 4C (discussing how Baltimore schools banned pogs because of their gam-
bling influences); I. Nelson Rose, Betting on Beanie Babies, at http://www.gambling
andthelaw.com/beanie.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2003) (insisting Beanie Baby trad-
ing encouraged gambling).
115. See Burns, supra note 114, at 4C (noting similarities between marbles and
Pogs, but commenting marbles were not banned in schools in their heyday, while
Pogs were); Rose, supra note 114 (arguing Beanie Babies had become "collectibles of
the betting generation").
116. See Burns, supra note 114, at 4C (noting permissibility of marbles on
school grounds and impermissibility of Pogs); see also Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1085-88
(outlining most recent Pokemon case).
117. Price 1I, 138 F.3d 602 (5th Cir. 1998).
118. Price v. Pinnacle Brands, Inc., No. 3:96-CV-2150-T, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11698, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Price I]. The class-action plain-
tiffs contended:
20031
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The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for
plaintiffs' failure to show damage to their business or property and
thus establish standing under RICO. 119
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court and refused to
adhere to the plaintiffs' argument that their standing assertions
were at least enough to survive the pleading stage.' 20 The court
also refused to determine standing by following the Southern Dis-
trict of California's rationale of analyzing the laws of New York and
New Jersey, where the plaintiffs lived and purchased the cards. 121
The Fifth Circuit ultimately concluded the only possible injury the
plaintiff could claim would be an expectancy interest, which did not
satisfy the RICO requirement. 122
[The defendant] market[ed] its cards by randomly inserting one or more
valuable chase cards in sealed packages containing six to twenty cards....
The odds of obtaining a chase card are printed on the package. Plaintiffs
contend[ed] this meets the definition of gambling, which requires con-
sideration (the price of the pack), chance (chase cards are obtained by
chance), and prize (chase cards have value).
Id. at *2-3 (citing Wink v. Griffith Amusement Co., 100 S.W.2d 695, 701 (Tex.
1936)).
119. See id. at *3-7. The plaintiffs contended "[t]he amount of damages [was]
the consideration paid . . . for the cards." Id. at *5. The court, however, agreed
with the defendant that "[p]laintiffs [were] unable to plead cognizable RICO in-
jury because they [were] not injured by virtue of their voluntary participation in a
purchase for which they received their bargained for consideration. 'They got ex-
actly what they paid for and they do not and cannot allege otherwise."' Id. For an
in-depth discussion of the standing requirement for a RICO suit, see supra notes
44-64 and accompanying text.
120. See Price I, 138 F.3d at 604-06 (affirming district court's decision to dis-
miss plaintiffs' RICO complaint).
121. See id. at 606-07 (citing Schwartz II, 967 F. Supp. 405, 411-15 (S.D. Cal.
1997); Schwartz v. Upper Deck Co., 956 F. Supp. 1552, 1555 (S.D. Cal. 1997)
[hereinafter Schwartz I]). The plaintiffs pleaded for the court to follow Schwartz II
because they determined "New York and NewJersey recognize a person's property
interest in money spent on games of chance and authorize civil actions to recover
such funds." Id. at 606 (citing Schwartz II, 967 F. Stipp. at 414-15 (citing N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAw § 5-423 (McKinney 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:40-5 (West 1987))).
The Fifth Circuit instead followed the defendant's argument:
[l]f we were deciding whether [the defendant] had committed a state law
predicate act, application of the [New York and New Jersey] state gam-
bling laws would be necessary .... [T]he fact that a victim of gambling in
New York or New jersey has a state law remedy to recover an amount
equal to a multiple of the money spent to gamble does not make plain-
tiffs' claim for its consideration a property loss tinder RICO.
Id. at 607.
122. See Price ll, 138 F.3d at 607 (citing In re Taxable Mun. Bond Sec. Litig., 51
F.3d 518, 523 (5th Cir. 1995)). "Injury to mere expectancy interests or to an 'in-
tangible property interest' is not sufficient to confer RICO standing." Id. (citing
Heinold v. Perlstein, 651 F. Supp. 1410, 1411 (E.D. Pa. 1987)). For a discussion of
the requirements to establish standing for RICO, see supra notes 44-64 and accom-
panying text.
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The Eastern District of New York decided a similar issue in Ma-
jor League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Price.123 The trading card manu-
facturer plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and injunction
against the card purchaser defendants to prevent them from bring-
ing a RICO action because they lacked standing. 2 4 The defendants
wished to sue the plaintiffs under RICO by claiming the manufac-
turing, marketing, and sale of trading card packages with randomly
inserted "chase cards" constituted illegal gambling.1 25
The district court noted the attorneys for the defendants
"[had] shopped around to find a forum 'friendly' to their claims in
order to induce a financial settlement. '" 12 6 After briefly outlining
the other jurisdictions' analyses and holdings, the court indicated it
would not sympathize with the defendants in their latest attempt to
recover RICO damages.127
The court specifically addressed and rejected the Southern Dis-
trict of California's prior analysis of the New York statutes, upon
which the defendants in this case relied in their RICO claim.' 28 It
first declared New York law could not furnish a gambling-related
RICO "racketeering activity" for trading card purchasers. 129 Even if
123. MLB Props., 105 F. Supp. 2d 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
124. See id. at 48 (explaining plaintiff's assertion that defendants could show
no "'[injury] in [their] business or property by reason of acts allegedly in violation
of RICO"). The opinion came after the defendants moved to dismiss the action
for failure to state a claim and for lack ofjurisdiction. See id. (showing procedural
history).
125. See id. (noting nature of defendants' planned claims).
126. Id. Interestingly, the three primary cases considered in this Note, Chaset,
MLB Properties, and Price II, share common parties-Jeffrey Fishman, Lance Kuba,
Steven Price, and possibly others-who have attempted to bring almost identical
claims for treble damages in the various jurisdictions. See id. at 46-56; see also
Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int'l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002); Price II, 138
F.3d at 604.
127. See MLB Props., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 49. The court noted, "Congress en-
acted RICO 'to combat organized crime, not to provide a federal cause of action
and treble damages' for personal injuries." Id. (quoting Oscar v. Univ. Students
Co-Op. Ass'n, 965 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir. 1992)).
128. See id. at 50-52 (discussing court's assumption that selling trading cards
meets RICO definition of "racketeering activity").
129. See id. at 51 ("[N]o statutory provision in New York law penalizes the
individual sale to a 'person' of a pack of trading cards with 'imprisonment for
more than one year.'"). The court insisted it could not utilize the statute upon
which the California court relied-New York Penal Law section 225.10-because
its application required an individual to have paid "more than five hundred dollars
in any one day of money played in such scheme or enterprise." Id. (citing N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 225.10 (McKinney 2000)). Even though it may be possible for an
individual trading card purchaser to meet this requirement, the defendants in this
case could not show in their pleadings that they had done so. See id. Additionally,
the court said the only statute that could possibly prohibit the alleged illicit trading
card activity would be New York Penal Law section 225.05. See id. That statute
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the court was able to find an applicable state law and requisite rack-
eteering activity, it refused to follow the California court's finding
that the defendants could establish the required standing.13 0 The
court admitted it would possibly change its opinion if a trading card
purchaser proved some sort of marketing "swindle."'' Neverthe-
less, the defendants had not made such an allegation and the court
declared the defendants could not establish a RICO action.' 3 2
With these cases pending in the Fifth Circuit and the Eastern
District of New York, many of the same plaintiffs filed claims in the
Southern District of California. 33 The plaintiffs purchased trading
cards hoping to receive "chase cards," and sued various trading
card companies for illegal gambling under RICO.' 3 4 The district
"makes someone guilty of the misdemeanor offense of 'promoting gambling in the
second degree when he knowingly advances or profits from unlawful gambling
activity."' Id. (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.05 (McKinney 2000)). Because this
offense does not constitute a felony, however, it cannot be a "racketeering activity"
under RICO. See id. For a discussion of what constitutes a "racketeering activity,"
see supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
130. See MLB Props., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 51 ("[T]his court does not adopt the
California District Court's analysis as to the nature of the actual transaction and
the New York statutory right to recover gambling losses."). The court maintained
that the card purchasers received compensation for what they paid-"a random
assortment of regular cards and a chance to receive an insert card"-which "deliv-
ers actual value to each party because the chance itself is of value regardless of
whether or not the card purchaser later suffers a 'loss.'" Id. It ftrther held that
any New York law that would invalidate the "gambling" with trading cards would
not affect the lack of standing because "[t] he purchasers received a benefit regard-
less of the transactions' illegality or voidness." Id. at 52. For a discussion of the
standing requirement for RICO, see supra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
131. See MLB Props., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 52 ("The situation might be different
if the licensors and manufacturers caused some tangible financial loss by misrepre-
senting the odds or by some other swindle."). Still, "recoverability of the money
spent means only that card purchasers have a claim under state law .... '[I]t does
not follow that any injury for which a plaintiff might assert a state law claim is
necessarily sufficient to establish a claim under RICO."' Id. (quoting Price II, 138
F.3d at 607). Ultimately, in New York, "the statutory right to recover gambling
losses is directed only toward the purpose of eliminating the lottery promoter's
financial incentive. [It] does not ... indicate that gambling transactions are inher-
ently injurious. With its limited purpose and sphere, the statutory right shares no
nexus with federal RICO." Id. at 53.
132. See id. at 53 (denying RICO claim).
133. See, e.g., Dumas II, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1220 (S.D. Cal. 2000). The
district court ultimately heard eight cases, but it only published three of the opin-
ions, each published sequentially and all virtually indistinguishable. See id.; Rodri-
guez v. Topps Co., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1224 (S.D. Cal. 2000); Schwartz v. Upper
Deck Co., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1228 (S.D. Cal. 2000) [hereinafter Schwartz III].
For simplification within this Note, this "common opinion" will be referred to as
the Dumas I opinion only.
134. See Dumas II, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1221-22. Plaintiffs in Dumas I and
Schwartz Halleged an alternative state law claim under California Business and Pro-
fessional Code section 17200, which the Dumas H and Schwartz III courts dismissed
for jurisdictional reasons. See Schwartz II, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 (dismissing state
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court denied the defendants' early dismissal motions.1 35 In its de-
finitive common opinion, however, the court dismissed each plain-
tiff's RICO claims for failure to establish adequate standing. 136
In the common opinion, the district court refuted the plain-
tiffs' claim that the consideration paid for the trading cards suffi-
ciently doubled as an injury to their business or property. 3 7 Even
though the court agreed that the plaintiffs might possess a valid
common law gambling claim, their right to redress under that
claim did not satisfy the RICO standing requirement. 38 Without
some evidence of "fraud or dishonesty with respect to Defendants'
gambling activity," the plaintiffs could not claim an injury. 139
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S "COMPREHENSIVE" OPINION
Much like its predecessors, the Ninth Circuit began its analysis
by listing the elements a plaintiff must meet to bring a satisfactory
RICO complaint. 140 Because the Southern District of California
had dismissed all eight cases for the appellants' lack of RICO stand-
ing, the Ninth Circuit then concentrated on the two components
law claim with leave to amend); Dumas II, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1221 (dismissing
pendant state claims without prejudice); see also Dumas I, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1170,
1172 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (alleging claim under California Business and Professional
Code section 17200); Schwartz II, 967 F. Supp. 405, 408 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (claiming
violation of California Business and Professional Code section 17200). For a dis-
cussion of California Business and Professional Code section 17200, see supra notes
106-08 and accompanying text.
135. See Dumas I, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 1183 (rejecting defendant's motion to
dismiss RICO claim); Schwartz II, 967 F. Supp. at 417 (denying defendant's motion
to dismiss for failure to state RICO claim).
136. See Dumas II, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (dismissing plaintiffs' RICO claim
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
137. See id. at 1222-23. For a discussion of the RICO standing requirement,
see supra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
138. See Dumas II, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1222-23 (stating plaintiffs' state law rem-
edy "does not equate with the standing requirement of [18 U.S.C.] § 1964(c)").
The court refused to determine specifically whether the "illegal gambling" would
fulfill the requisite requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 because it found no
standing. See id. For a discussion of the all the required elements of a civil RICO
claim, see supra notes 41-82 and accompanying text.
139. Dumas II, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1223. The court specifically suggested, "mis-
representing to purchasers the odds of winning a chase card" could be a form of
fraud present in this type of case. Id. The court also pointed out, while state laws
rely on public policy to punish a racketeering activity like illegal gambling, RICO
follows a specific test requiring actual injury to sustain relief. See id.
140. See Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int'l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002)
(discussing RICO suit elements); see also Price II, 138 F.3d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 1998)
(outlining RICO claim requirements); MLB Props., 105 F. Supp. 2d 46, 49-51
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (listing elements of RICO claim). For a complete discussion of
each RICO element, see supra notes 41-82 and accompanying text. For a descrip-
tion of the facts of the Chaset case, see supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
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related to standing.' 4' The court agreed that "a civil RICO plaintiff
must show that his injury was proximately caused by the [prohib-
ited] conduct ... [and] that he has suffered a concrete financial
loss." 142
After establishing these principles, the court briefly reviewed
the Price and MLB Properties cases because they shared nearly identi-
cal facts.' 43 It first highlighted the Fifth Circuit's assertion that
"[i] njury to mere expectancy interests or to an 'intangible property
interest' is not sufficient to confer RICO standing."'144 It next reit-
erated the Eastern District of New York's assessment that "[t]he
chance [of receiving a 'chase card'] is real, and having paid for it
and received it, the card purchaser has not suffered any financial
loss or RICO property injury."'14 5
The Ninth Circuit also determined the plaintiffs could not es-
tablish standing and therefore could not sue under RICO. 146 Fol-
lowing those limited treatments by the other jurisdictions, the
Ninth Circuit made the broad statement that it "agree[d] with
those courts, with the district court, and with all other courts that
have considered this issue."'14 7 It noted the value of the plaintiffs'
141. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1086-87 ("[The standing] element includes two
related components.") (quoting Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Stites, 258 F.3d 1016,
1021 (9th Cir. 2001)). For a comprehensive review of the RICO standing element,
see supra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
142. Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1086-87 (quoting Stites, 258 F.3d at 1021). "To
demonstrate injury for RICO purposes, plaintiffs must show proof of concrete fi-
nancial loss, and not mere iniury to a valuable intangible property interest." Id.
(citing Oscar v. Univ. Students Co-Op. Ass'n, 965 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir. 1992)).
For an in-depth discussion of the standing element of RICO, see supra notes 44-64
and accompanying text.
143. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1087. Even though other jurisdictions have con-
sidered the implications of a RICO claim against trading card manufacturers,
"[this] issue ... is one of first impression in [the Ninth C]ircuit." Id. For an
explanation of the Price 11 decision, see supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
For a summary of the MLB Properties opinion, see supra notes 123-32 and accompa-
nying text.
144. Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1087 (quoting Price l, 138 F.3d at 607). "Plaintiffs do
not allege that they received something different than precisely what they bar-
gained for: six to twenty cards in a pack with a chance that one of those cards may
- be [a chase card]." Id. (quoting Price l, 138 F.3d at 607) (emphasis added). For a
full analysis of the Price H opinion, see supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
145. Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1087 (quoting MLBProps., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 51). For
a complete discussion of the MLB Properties opinion, see supra notes 123-32 and
accompanying text.
146. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1087. For a discussion of the standing element of
a RICO complaint, see supra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
147. Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1087. For a treatment of all relevant cases in which
courts have deliberated RICO suits against trading card companies, see supra notes
117-39 and accompanying text.
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deal should be determined at the time of purchase. 48 At that time,
"they received value-eight or ten cards, one of which might be an
insert card-for what they paid as a purchase price" and thus could
not properly claim an injury. 149 Finally, the court flatly denied the
plaintiffs' plea to overturn the district court's denial of a leave to
amend their complaint to properly allege a valid injury. 151
The brevity of this last denial, of the treatment of other juris-
dictions' opinions, and of the overall reasoning hindered the Ninth
Circuit's opinion. 15' The Ninth Circuit even neglected to analyze
the lower court opinion's content and merits.1 52 It noted the lower
court's "holding that there was no injury because plaintiffs 'struck a
bargain with Defendants and received the benefit of their bar-
gain,"' but neglected to outline or examine it further. 53
Although the Ninth Circuit may have limited its opinion inten-
tionally to discredit forum-shopping plaintiffs, its shortness may
have actually hindered the effort to prevent similar future ac-
tions. 154 These plaintiffs may have actively sought a cooperative
and sympathetic jurisdiction. 55 In refusing to entertain jurisdic-
tion, the court offered a meager discussion of the case and left the
door open for future litigation. 15 6
148. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1087 (explaining purchase is appropriate time at
which to determine value of cards).
149. Id. ("Their disappointment upon not finding an insert card in the pack-
age is not an injury to property.").
150. See id. at 1087-88. The court said: "We conclude that the plaintiffs can-
not cure the basic flaw in their pleading. Because any amendment would be futile,
there is no need to prolong the litigation by permitting further amendment." Id.
at 1088 (emphasis added). For an analysis of what a plaintiff would need to prop-
erly allege a RICO complaint, see supra notes 41-82 and accompanying text.
151. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1083-88. The opinion is only five pages long, and
the entire analysis begins on the third page. See id. The Ninth Circuit devoted
only one paragraph apiece to the Fifth Circuit's opinion, the Eastern District of
New York's opinion, and the amendment consideration. See id. at 1087-88.
152. See id. at 1085-88. The only mention the Ninth Circuit made of the Cali-
fornia district court common opinion was, "[w]e agree with ... the district court."
Id. at 1087.
153. Id. at 1086 (quoting Dumas II, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1223 (S.D. Cal.
2000)).
154. The Eastern District of New York first highlighted an attempt to forum
shop: "For the last three years, the card purchasers, represented chiefly by the
attorneys in this case, have shopped around to find a forum 'friendly' to their
claims in order to induce a financial settlement." MLB Props., 105 F. Supp. 2d 46,
48 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
155. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1083 (indicating continued effort of same MLB
Properties plaintiffs in new jurisdiction); see also MLB Props., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 48
(discussing forum shopping).
156. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1087 (indicating court did little more than say it
"agree [d] with" other jurisdictions and lower court). For a discussion of the Ninth
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Specifically, the court seemed to treat the issue in this case as
though no factual, procedural, or analytical change in the future,
by these or similarly situated plaintiffs, could change its holding,
which may not be true.157 For example, the court never discussed
whether California gambling laws could possibly supplement a
RICO action.158 The lower court specifically noted the California
laws did not help the plaintiffs show a RICO injury, but the Ninth
Circuit neglected to explain those laws or their possible implication
upon the plaintiffs' RICO claims.' 5 9 The relevant portion of the
California Business and Professional Code to which the plaintiffs
appealed requires proof of fraudulent activity by a defendant.1 60 If
proved, the fraudulent activity may be enough for a plaintiff to es-
tablish a RICO injury. 161
The Ninth Circuit did not discuss the merits of fraud allega-
tions as a possible RICO injury and expressly denied the plaintiffs'
alternative plea to amend their complaint. 162 Even if the court de-
nied the plaintiffs' right to amend because it found no merit in the
fraud claim as a possible RICO injury, it could have expanded its
Circuit's reasoning in its brief opinion, see supra notes 140-50 and accompanying
text.
157. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1085-88 (insisting any amendment to complaint
would be useless).
158. See id. at 1083-88 (showing lack of discussion of California state law).
The Eastern District of New York undertook such considerations in its opinion. See
MLB Props., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 51-53 (discussing relevant state laws). For a review
of the relevant California gambling statutes, see supra notes 90-108 and accompa-
nying text.
159. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1085-88 (failing to mention California laws). But
see Dumas 1I, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1222-23 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing California
laws' inability to support civil RICO injury requirement). The original opinions in
the Southern District of California indicate the plaintiffs sought relief under the
California Business and Professional Code § 17200. See Dumas I, 52 F. Supp. 2d
1170, 1173 (S.D. Cal. 1999); Schwartz I, 967 F. Supp. 405, 408 (S.D. Cal. 1997); see
also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, 17202, 17203, 17206 (West 1997). For a
discussion of the California gambling laws, see supra notes 90-105 and accompany-
ing text. For a discussion of the civil RICO injury requirement, see supra notes 44-
64 and accompanying text.
160. See Dumas 1, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 1172 (noting plaintiffs' use of California
Business and Professional Code). "[U]nfair competition shall mean and include
any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive,
untrue or misleading advertising." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997).
For a more detailed treatment of this statute, see supra notes 106-08 and accompa-
nying text.
161. See Dumas 1!, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1223 (describing fraud or misconduct as
sufficient to constitute RICO injury); see also Sedima II, 473 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1985)
(recognizing fraudulent activity as RICO injury). For a more in-depth treatment of
Dumas H, see supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text. For a discussion of what
constitutes an injury under RICO, see supra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
162. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1086-88 (lacking discussion of fraud and denying
plaintiffs' motion to amend complaint).
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discussion. 163 The court merely said it agreed with the district
court; if viewed broadly, this would mean the Ninth Circuit agreed
with everything the district court said. 164 If that were true, the Ninth
Circuit would agree that alleged fraud possibly could satisfy the
RICO injury requirement, but its refusal to allow a "futile" amend-
ment of the complaint does not square with that view. 165 Addition-
ally, one of the unpublished cases on appeal specifically alleged
fraud, but the Ninth Circuit did not even discuss it.166 The court
could have addressed this issue of fraud classifying a RICO injury
and ultimately expand or contract the breadth of RICO protec-
tions, but it did not.1 67
The Ninth Circuit also neglected to discuss whether California
gambling laws could satisfy a racketeering activity under RICO.168
Granted, if the court would have discussed the four RICO elements
beyond standing, it would have been dicta because its analysis could
end properly with a finding of lack of standing. 169 Nonetheless, if
the court were to have allowed the plaintiffs to amend the com-
plaint to allege fraud and were to find the fraud sufficient for the
RICO injury requirement, it would have had to discuss the remain-
163. See id. (neglecting to mention possibility of fraud claim as RICO injury).
164. See id. at 1087. For a summary of the district court opinion, see supra
notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
165. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1088 (refusing to allow amendment to complaint);
see also Dumas II, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1223 (noting possibility of fraud satisfying civil
RICO injury). For a discussion of the civil RICO injury requirement, see supra
notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
166. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1085-88. The plaintiffs in the prior unpublished
case specifically alleged:
[T]he wrapping for the Pokemon trading card packages states only in gen-
eral terms that the odds of obtaining a premium card are approximately
one in 33. Plaintiffs contend that in reality, the odds of obtaining each of
the 150 different Pokemon cards, including the premium cards, vary
greatly. They claim, as an example, that the chances of getting a [certain
rare card] in a package is believed to be one in 66, while the chances of
getting a [different rare card] is believed to be one in 33.
Consumers, supra note 5, at 10.
167. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1086-88 (failing to clarify whether fraud or miscon-
duct constituted RICO injury).
168. See id. For a discussion of what constitutes a racketeering activity under
RICO, see supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Cali-
fornia gambling laws, see supra notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
169. See Price II, 138 F.3d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[Before four RICO ele-
ments are considered,] a plaintiff must establish that he [or she] has standing to
sue."); Dumas II, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1223 ("Having determined that Plaintiffs lack
standing under [18 U.S.C.] § 1964(c), the Court need not, and therefore does not,
analyze further elements by [18 U.S.C.] § 1962."). For a discussion of the elements
necessary to establish a civil RICO claim, see supra notes 41-82 and accompanying
text.
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ing four elements. 7 Still, the court could have discussed the four
other RICO elements in the context of the particular facts of this
case, even if in dicta, to attempt to clarify how the California gam-
bling laws relate.' 71
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit could have considered the merits
of a possible plaintiff's state law claim. 172 This could have helped
the court encourage future plaintiffs to seek relief elsewhere.173 If
the court were to discuss the possibilities of relief available under
state law, it could protect itself from future similar cases because
plaintiffs may realize they have a better chance in state court. 174
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit could have better served itself
and the judicial system by following a comprehensive, analytic pat-
tern similar to that used by the Fifth Circuit and Eastern District of
New York. 175 After discussing the RICO requirements and limita-
tions, the court could have described more fully the individual par-
ties' contentions. 176 It also could have undertaken more analysis of
the relevant legal precedent. 177 Finally, it could have discussed the
170. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1086-88 (refusing to allow plaintiffs to amend com-
plaint). For an outline of how a plaintiff establishes a civil RICO action, see supra
notes 41-82 and accompanying text.
171. See Dumas I, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1183 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (admitting Cali-
fornia gambling laws may establish racketeering activity for RICO purposes).
"[T]he use of 'chase' cards may violate [California Penal Code] § 319." Id. For a
discussion of California Penal Code section 319 and other lottery laws, see supra
notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Dumas II, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1223 (discussing state law claims);
Dumas 1, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 1172-73, 1182-83 (discussing plaintiffs' appeals to Cali-
fornia Penal Code and California Business and Professional Code). For a discus-
sion of the California gambling laws, see supra notes 90-105 and accompanying
text.
173. See Dumas I, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1223-24 (dismissing state law claims); see
also Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1083-88 (failing to mention appeal of dismissal).
174. See Price I1, 138 F.3d at 606-07 (discussing state law claims); MLB Props.,
105 F. Supp. 2d 46, 50-53 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (mentioning claims available under state
law).
175. See Price II, 138 F.3d at 605-08 (outlining courts reasoning); MLB Props.,
105 F. Supp. 2d at 48-53 (showing court's discussion). For an outline of the Fifth
Circuit's analysis in Price II, see supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text. For a
summary of the Eastern District of New York's opinion in MLB Properties, see supra
notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
176. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1085-88 (failing to give comprehensive description
of parties' arguments). But see Price II, 138 F.3d at 606-07 (outlining parties' asser-
tions); MLB Props., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 49-52 (describing reasoning of parties).
177. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1087 (dedicating only one paragraph each to Price
//and MLB Properties, and showing no treatment of lower court opinion). But see
Price I1, 138 F.3d at 607-08 (discussing available precedent, even though this was
essentially first decision of its kind); MLB Props., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 48-52 (analyz-
ing prior decisions). For a discussion of the relevant court precedents, see supra
notes 117-32 and accompanying text.
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relevant state laws underlying the plaintiffs' RICO claims.' 78 By am-
plifying its opinion to discuss the issues comprehensively, the Ninth
Circuit could have avoided similar RICO claims, which it may face
in the future.
V. SUING TRADING CARD COMPANIES MAY BE A GAMBI.E
An excited child's repeated purchase and swapping of trading
cards may not provide an ideal basis for a RICO claim. 179 Despite
this reality, plaintiffs' attempts to seek treble damages from trading
card companies for alleged RICO violations may not cease soon.' 80
The Ninth Circuit's brief and amorphous opinion may have left the
door open for future litigation.1 8' The Supreme Court is unlikely
to hear this issue soon because the Ninth Circuit did not create a
circuit split, yet the Chaset result probably will not deter future liti-
gants from again attempting similar claims in the lower courts. 182
The unanswered questions in Chaset may encourage litigants to con-
tinue to seek relief using different tactics.18 3
Even if more plaintiffs attempt to seek relief under RICO, they
will likely not succeed.' 8 4 Congress created RICO to combat organ-
ized crime, and incidentally offered a civil remedy for victims of the
organized illicit behavior.'35 Realistically, trading card companies, the
178. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1085-88 (failing to mention California state laws).
But see Price I1, 138 F.3d at 606-07 (analyzing implications of state laws upon RICO
action); MLB Props., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 50-53 (discussing state laws thoroughly).
For a list of the relevant California statutes, see supra notes 90-105 and accompany-
ing text.
179. See Halperin, supra note 1 (describing hypothetical child gambling
phenomenon).
180. For examples of RICO suits against trading card companies, as in Chaset,
Price II, and MLB Properties, see supra notes 24-34, 117-50 and accompanying text.
181. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1083-88. For a discussion of how the opinion is
amorphous and of the possible effects of its brevity, see supra notes 151-78 and
accompanying text.
182. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1087 (agreeing with Price H and MLB Properties).
183. See id. at 1085-88 (showing no analysis of state law or district court's treat-
ment). For a discussion of this deficiency and others, see supra notes 151-78 and
accompanying text.
184. See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1088 (dismissing plaintiffs' case); Price II, 138 F.3d
602, 608 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding for defendants); MLB Props., 105 F. Supp. 2d 46,
53 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying recovery to plaintiffs). These cases indicate that no
plaintiff to date has succeeded in a suit against a trading card company under
RICO.
185. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000) (outlining RICO). For a history of the
RICO statute, see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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facilitators of a national pastime, are not engaging in fraudulent
activity, nor are they architects of a national epidemic. 86
Even though the trading card companies' marketing practices
may have caused an influx in card sales, they are not necessarily
villains.18 7 The companies are doing nothing more than success-
fully creating a fad.'"- They have little to do with the secondary
market created by the card traders and merely utilize the artificial
demand and brilliant marketing to conduct a profitable, legal
business. 89
Much like the popularity of the trading cards themselves, the
trend of suing manufacturers should eventually wane. Expensive
civil RICO settlements have been the clear motivating factor for
these plaintiffs because courts have all but said plaintiffs may have
valid state court remedies and plaintiffs have yet to pursue those
options seriously.' 90 Even if the plaintiffs were to pursue state law
claims, they may have a difficult case. 191
If card manufacturers were actually to be held liable, some crit-
ics wonder where the line of culpability would be drawn.' 92 Per-
186. See MLB Props., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 53 (indicating Eastern District of New
York did not feel actions of trading card companies created serious problems be-
cause card purchasers "have not been the victims of a nationwide scourge requir-
ing a nationwide remedy").
187. See Consumers, supra note 5, at 10. Some allege that the Pokdmon trading
card manufacturers, "to encourage kids to buy multiple packages of Pokemon
cards[,] . . . have created a card game where . . . the more powerful chase cards
increase the players' chance of winning. This necessitates the purchase of multiple
packages of cards in order to increase the possibility of obtaining the more pre-
mium cards." Id. Still, "[s]ome parents think the game encourages reading, criti-
cal thinking and social interaction. . . . 'Pokemon is a great learning tool .... It is
teaching [kids] what things cost and how to save money. It also teaches [them]
how to negotiate and to get along with other kids."' Hooked, supra note 8.
188. See Hooked, supra note 8 ("Undoubtedly, [Pokemon card trading] is a fad
and will be replaced in a short time ....").
189. See Kent, supra note 4 ("In Nintendo's eyes, [the] rare foil-backed trad-
ing card is worth no more money than the [standard] cards that are so common
that some kids throw them away."). For a discussion of the secondary market, see
supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
190. See Price II, 138 F.3d 602, 607 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting possibility of state
law action).
191. See id. (discussing only possibility of state law claim); MLB Props., 105 F.
Supp. 2d at 51 (refuting possible success of state law claim).
192. See Kent, supra note 4 (noting irrationality of lawsuit). Kent commented:
If Nintendo is culpable for gambling by offering a rare card in every
one-of-eleven packages, how about those gum machines that have one
capsule with a watch or a nice pocket knife and about 100 capsules with
rubber spiders? Is that illegal gambling, too?
How about McDonalds'[s] annual Monopoly game promotion? In
that promotion you receive little cards on large drinks and fries that can
add up to millions of dollars worth of prizes.
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haps the Ninth Circuit purposely gave little treatment to this issue
because it recognized the absurdity of using RICO under such cir-
cumstances. 19 3 Perhaps the latest failure in the RICO crusade
could show parents that monitoring their children may be the best
way to curb their "gambling" habits.194 Instead of going forward
with federal suits, parents and card traders should take a step back
to evaluate and adjust their conduct. 195
Christopher D. Mudd
Id.
193. See Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int'l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1083-88 (9th Cir.
2002). The court simply may have agreed with the other jurisdictions that consid-
ered the issue and refused to give the plaintiffs any more credit or treatment than
it believed they deserved.
194. See Pokemon Racketeers, ARIz. DAILY WILDCAT, Oct. 14, 1999, available at
http://wildcat.arizona.edu/papers/93/38/04-3-m.html. "Parents are setting a
bad example by suing the [trading card] compan ies].... Did it ever occur to the
parents to talk about the issue with their children? Did it occur to them to say,
'No, Timmy, you can't buy those cards?"' Id.
195. See Our View, supra note 14, at 4A. The article posits:
When fads become obsessions, either for children or adults, we should
[not] blame the companies who marketed the concept. Instead, we
should examine the flaws in our society that introduce chinks in the ar-
mor of effective parenting and produce adults who think like children
and thus are unable to be adults to their own offspring.
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